1.
Mills, C.W.: Alternative Epistemologies. In: Blackness Visible : Essays on Philosophy and Race. pp. 21–40. Cornell University Press (1998).
2.
Hartsock, N.C.M.: The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism. In: Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science. pp. 283–310. Reidel, Dordrecht (1983).
3.
McKinnon, R.: Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica (preprint deposited by the author on academia.edu). 92, 419–440 (2015).
4.
standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes, https://www.listennotes.com/search/?q=standpoint%20epistemology&sort_by_date=0&scope=episode&offset=0&language=Any%20language&len_min=0&ecount_min=0.
5.
Fricker, M.: Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book). In: Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. pp. 147–175. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009).
6.
Nora Berenstain: Epistemic Exploitation. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 3, (2016).
7.
Jenkins, K.: Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 34, 191–205 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12174.
8.
Kristie Dotson: A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies. 33, (2012). https://doi.org/10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024.
9.
Wesley Buckwalter: Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
10.
28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes, https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/.
11.
Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes, https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/.
12.
Beeby, L.: A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). 111, 479–486 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00319.x.
13.
Stroud, B.: The significance of philosophical scepticism. Clarendon, Oxford (1984).
14.
Williams, M.: Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
15.
Descartes, R., Weissman, D., Bluhm, W.T., Descartes, R.: Meditation One. In: Discourse on the method: and, Meditations on first philosophy. pp. 58–62. Yale University Press, New Haven.
16.
Ayer, A.J.: The problem of knowledge. Penguin, London (1956).
17.
Robinson, H.: Perception. Routledge, London (1994).
18.
Austin, J.L., Warnock, G.J.: Sense and sensibilia. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1962).
19.
Fischer, E., Engelhardt, P.E., Horvath, J., Ohtani, H.: Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. Synthese. (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4.
20.
Blackmore, S.J.: Consciousness: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2017).
21.
Chalmers, D.J.: The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, New York (1996).
22.
Gettier, E.L.: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis. 23, (1963). https://doi.org/10.2307/3326922.
23.
Williams, M.: Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
24.
Fogelin, R.J.: Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. Oxford University Press, New York (1994).
25.
Williams, M.: Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).
26.
Fogelin, R.J.: Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories. In: Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. pp. 31–40. Oxford University Press, New York (1994).
27.
Keith DeRose: Introduction: Responding to Skepticism. In: Skepticism: a contemporary reader. Oxford University Press, New York (1999).
28.
Holyoak, K.J., Morrison, R.G., Holyoak, K.J.: A model of heuristic judgment. In: The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005).
29.
Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M: Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 2, 56–80 (2007).
30.
Kenneth Boyd, Jennifer Nagel: The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In: Current controversies in experimental philosophy. pp. 109–127. Routledge, New York (2014).
31.
Berker, S.: THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM. Philosophical Issues. 23, 363–387 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12019.
32.
Singer, D.J.: How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. The Philosophical Quarterly. 68, 580–602 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx056.
33.
Roberts, P., Andow, J., Schmidtke, K.A.: Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese. 195, 3267–3287 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6.
34.
Shaffer, J., Knobe, J.: Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs. (2012).
35.
DeRose, K.: Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. (2011).
36.
Buckwalter, W.: Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 1, 395–406 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3.
37.
Nagel, Jennifer: The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT. (2011).
38.
Gerken, M., Beebe, J.: Knowledge in and out of Contrast. Nous. (2016).
39.
Nagel, J.: Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In: Knowledge ascriptions. pp. 171–191. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2012).
