[1]
28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes: https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/.
[2]
Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M 2007. Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. 2, 1 (2007), 56–80.
[3]
Austin, J.L. and Warnock, G.J. 1962. Sense and sensibilia. Clarendon Press.
[4]
Ayer, A.J. 1956. The problem of knowledge. Penguin.
[5]
Beeby, L. 2011. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). 111, 3pt3 (Oct. 2011), 479–486. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00319.x.
[6]
Berker, S. 2013. THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM. Philosophical Issues. 23, 1 (Oct. 2013), 363–387. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12019.
[7]
Blackmore, S.J. 2017. Consciousness: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
[8]
Buckwalter, W. 2010. Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 1, 3 (Sep. 2010), 395–406. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3.
[9]
Chalmers, D.J. 1996. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
[10]
DeRose, K. 2011. Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. (2011).
[11]
Descartes, R. et al. Meditation One. Discourse on the method: and, Meditations on first philosophy. Yale University Press. 58–62.
[12]
Fischer, E. et al. 2019. Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. Synthese. (Jan. 2019). DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4.
[13]
Fogelin, R.J. 1994. Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories. Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. Oxford University Press. 31–40.
[14]
Fogelin, R.J. 1994. Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. Oxford University Press.
[15]
Fricker, M. 2009. Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book). Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press. 147–175.
[16]
Gerken, M. and Beebe, J. 2016. Knowledge in and out of Contrast. Nous. (2016).
[17]
Gettier, E.L. 1963. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis. 23, 6 (Jun. 1963). DOI:https://doi.org/10.2307/3326922.
[18]
Hartsock, N.C.M. 1983. The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism. Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science. Reidel. 283–310.
[19]
Holyoak, K.J. et al. 2005. A model of heuristic judgment. The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
[20]
Jenkins, K. 2017. Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 34, 2 (Feb. 2017), 191–205. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12174.
[21]
Keith DeRose 1999. Introduction: Responding to Skepticism. Skepticism: a contemporary reader. Oxford University Press.
[22]
Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel 2014. The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. Current controversies in experimental philosophy. Routledge. 109–127.
[23]
Kristie Dotson 2012. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies. 33, 1 (2012). DOI:https://doi.org/10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024.
[24]
McKinnon, R. 2015. Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica (preprint deposited by the author on academia.edu). 92, 2 (2015), 419–440.
[25]
Mills, C.W. 1998. Alternative Epistemologies. Blackness Visible : Essays on Philosophy and Race. Cornell University Press. 21–40.
[26]
Nagel, J. 2012. Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. Knowledge ascriptions. Oxford University Press. 171–191.
[27]
Nagel, Jennifer 2011. The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT. (2011).
[28]
Nora Berenstain 2016. Epistemic Exploitation. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 3, 22 (2016).
[29]
Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes: https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/.
[30]
Roberts, P. et al. 2018. Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese. 195, 7 (Jul. 2018), 3267–3287. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6.
[31]
Robinson, H. 1994. Perception. Routledge.
[32]
Shaffer, J. and Knobe, J. 2012. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs. (2012).
[33]
Singer, D.J. 2018. How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. The Philosophical Quarterly. 68, 272 (Jul. 2018), 580–602. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx056.
[34]
standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes: https://www.listennotes.com/search/?q=standpoint%20epistemology&sort_by_date=0&scope=episode&offset=0&language=Any%20language&len_min=0&ecount_min=0.
[35]
Stroud, B. 1984. The significance of philosophical scepticism. Clarendon.
[36]
Wesley Buckwalter Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
[37]
Williams, M. 2001. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press.
[38]
Williams, M. 2001. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press.
[39]
Williams, M. 2001. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press.
