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N. C. M. Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism’, in Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science, vol. v. 161, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983, pp. 283–310 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3035986
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M. Fricker, ‘Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book)’, in Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 147–175 [Online]. Available: http://www.uea.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=694009
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‘28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes’. [Online]. Available: https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/
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‘Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes’. [Online]. Available: https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/
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M. Williams, Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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M. Williams, Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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R. J. Fogelin, ‘Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories’, in Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 31–40 [Online]. Available: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/reader.action?docID=3052370&ppg=46
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Keith DeRose, ‘Introduction: Responding to Skepticism’, in Skepticism: a contemporary reader, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M, ‘Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy’, Philosophy Compass, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 56–80, 2007 [Online]. Available: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pif&AN=PHL2103227&authtype=sso&custid=s8993828&site=eds-live&scope=site
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Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel, ‘The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions’, in Current controversies in experimental philosophy, New York: Routledge, 2014, pp. 109–127 [Online]. Available: https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203122884
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S. Berker, ‘THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM’, Philosophical Issues, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 363–387, Oct. 2013, doi: 10.1111/phis.12019.
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P. Roberts, J. Andow, and K. A. Schmidtke, ‘Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity’, Synthese, vol. 195, no. 7, pp. 3267–3287, Jul. 2018, doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6.
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K. DeRose, ‘Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys’, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 2011 [Online]. Available: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41487722&site=eds-live&scope=site
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W. Buckwalter, ‘Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 395–406, Sep. 2010, doi: 10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3.
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Nagel, Jennifer, ‘The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox’, PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT, 2011 [Online]. Available: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswah&AN=000208856300001&site=eds-live&scope=site
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M. Gerken and J. Beebe, ‘Knowledge in and out of Contrast’, Nous, 2016 [Online]. Available: https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com/doi/10.1111/nous.12064
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J. Nagel, ‘Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases’, in Knowledge ascriptions, 1st ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 171–191 [Online]. Available: https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001