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Mills CW. Alternative Epistemologies. In: Blackness Visible : Essays on Philosophy and Race. Cornell University Press 1998. 21–40.https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1508193&authtype=sso&custid=s8993828&site=eds-live&scope=site
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Hartsock NCM. The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism. In: Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science. Dordrecht: : Reidel 1983. 283–310.https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3035986
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McKinnon R. Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica (preprint deposited by the author on academia.edu) 2015;92:419–40.https://www.dropbox.com/s/gxlo1wqji8n4l2d/Trans_formative_Experiences%20%281%29.pdf?dl=0
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standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes. https://www.listennotes.com/search/?q=standpoint%20epistemology&sort_by_date=0&scope=episode&offset=0&language=Any%20language&len_min=0&ecount_min=0
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Fricker M. Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book). In: Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2009. 147–75.http://www.uea.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=694009
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Nora Berenstain. Epistemic Exploitation. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2016;3.https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0003.022/--epistemic-exploitation?rgn=main;view=fulltext
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Jenkins K. Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices. Journal of Applied Philosophy 2017;34:191–205. doi:10.1111/japp.12174
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Kristie Dotson. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 2012;33. doi:10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024
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Wesley Buckwalter. Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. Australasian Journal of Philosophyhttps://philpapers.org/rec/BUCEII
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28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes. https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/
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Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes. https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/
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Beeby L. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 2011;111:479–86. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00319.x
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Stroud B. The significance of philosophical scepticism. Oxford: : Clarendon 1984. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3053315
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Williams M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2001.
15
Descartes R, Weissman D, Bluhm WT, et al. Meditation One. In: Discourse on the method: and, Meditations on first philosophy. New Haven: : Yale University Press 58–62.https://search-ebscohost-com.uea.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=52973&site=eds-live&scope=site
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Ayer AJ. The problem of knowledge. London: : Penguin 1956.
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Robinson H. Perception. London: : Routledge 1994. https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203164358
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Austin JL, Warnock GJ. Sense and sensibilia. Oxford: : Clarendon Press 1962.
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Fischer E, Engelhardt PE, Horvath J, et al. Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. Synthese Published Online First: 17 January 2019. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4
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Blackmore SJ. Consciousness: a very short introduction. Second edition. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2017.
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Chalmers DJ. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. New York: : Oxford University Press 1996. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=272854
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Gettier EL. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 1963;23. doi:10.2307/3326922
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Williams M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2001.
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Fogelin RJ. Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. New York: : Oxford University Press 1994. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3052370
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Williams M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2001.
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Fogelin RJ. Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories. In: Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. New York: : Oxford University Press 1994. 31–40.https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/reader.action?docID=3052370&ppg=46
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Keith DeRose. Introduction: Responding to Skepticism. In: Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: : Oxford University Press 1999.
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Holyoak KJ, Morrison RG, Holyoak KJ. A model of heuristic judgment. In: The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2005.
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Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M. Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2007;2:56–80.https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pif&AN=PHL2103227&authtype=sso&custid=s8993828&site=eds-live&scope=site
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Kenneth Boyd, Jennifer Nagel. The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In: Current controversies in experimental philosophy. New York: : Routledge 2014. 109–27.https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203122884
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Berker S. THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM. Philosophical Issues 2013;23:363–87. doi:10.1111/phis.12019
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Singer DJ. How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. The Philosophical Quarterly 2018;68:580–602. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx056
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Roberts P, Andow J, Schmidtke KA. Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese 2018;195:3267–87. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6
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Shaffer J, Knobe J. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs Published Online First: 2012.https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41682692&site=eds-live&scope=site
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DeRose K. Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Published Online First: 2011.https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41487722&site=eds-live&scope=site
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Buckwalter W. Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2010;1:395–406. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3
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Nagel, Jennifer. The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT Published Online First: 2011.https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswah&AN=000208856300001&site=eds-live&scope=site
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Gerken M, Beebe J. Knowledge in and out of Contrast. Nous Published Online First: 2016.https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com/doi/10.1111/nous.12064
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Nagel J. Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In: Knowledge ascriptions. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2012. 171–91.https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001