

Knowledge, Science and Proof

PLEASE NOTE - This reading list is for the 2018/19 academic year and will be updated for the 2020/21 academic year. This is NOT the current year's reading list.

View Online



1

Mills CW. Alternative Epistemologies. In: Blackness Visible : Essays on Philosophy and Race . Cornell University Press 1998.
21-40.<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1508193&authtype=sso&custid=s8993828&site=eds-live&scope=site>

2

Hartsock NCM. The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism. In: Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science. Dordrecht: : Reidel 1983.
283-310.<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3035986>

3

McKinnon R. Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica (preprint deposited by the author on academia.edu) 2015;**92**
:419-40.https://www.dropbox.com/s/gxlo1wqji8n4l2d/Trans_formative_Experiences%20%281%29.pdf?dl=0

4

standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes.
https://www.listennotes.com/search/?q=standpoint%20epistemology&sort_by_date=0&scope=episode&offset=0&language=Any%20language&len_min=0&ecount_min=0

5

Fricker M. Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book). In: Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2009.

147-75.<http://www.uea.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=694009>

6

Nora Berenstain. Epistemic Exploitation. *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy* 2016;
3
<https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0003.022/--epistemic-exploitation?rgn=main;view=fulltext>

7

Jenkins K. Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 2017;**34**:191–205. doi:10.1111/japp.12174

8

Kristie Dotson. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 2012;**33**. doi:10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024

9

Wesley Buckwalter. Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*<https://philpapers.org/rec/BUCEII>

10

28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes.
<https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/>

11

Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes.
https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/

12

Beeby L. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Hardback) 2011;**111**:479–86. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00319.x

13

Stroud B. *The significance of philosophical scepticism*. Oxford: : Clarendon 1984.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3053315>

14

Williams M. *Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology*. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2001.

15

Descartes R, Weissman D, Bluhm WT, et al. Meditation One. In: *Discourse on the method: and, Meditations on first philosophy*. New Haven: : Yale University Press 58–62.
<https://search-ebscohost-com.uea.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=52973&site=eds-live&scope=site>

16

Ayer AJ. *The problem of knowledge*. London: : Penguin 1956.

17

Robinson H. *Perception*. London: : Routledge 1994.
<https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203164358>

18

Austin JL, Warnock GJ. *Sense and sensibilia*. Oxford: : Clarendon Press 1962.

19

Fischer E, Engelhardt PE, Horvath J, et al. *Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences*. Synthese Published Online First: 17

January 2019. doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4

20

Blackmore SJ. Consciousness: a very short introduction. Second edition. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2017.

21

Chalmers DJ. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. New York: : Oxford University Press 1996.
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=272854>

22

Gettier EL. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 1963;**23**. doi:10.2307/3326922

23

Williams M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2001.

24

Fogelin RJ. Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. New York: : Oxford University Press 1994.
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3052370>

25

Williams M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2001.

26

Fogelin RJ. Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories. In: Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. New York: : Oxford University Press 1994.
31–40.<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/reader.action?docID=3052370&ppg>

=46

27

Keith DeRose. Introduction: Responding to Skepticism. In: Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: : Oxford University Press 1999.

28

Holyoak KJ, Morrison RG, Holyoak KJ. A model of heuristic judgment. In: The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge: : Cambridge University Press 2005.

29

Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M. Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2007;**2**:56–80.<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pif&AN=PHL2103227&authtype=sso&custid=s8993828&site=eds-live&scope=site>

30

Kenneth Boyd, Jennifer Nagel. The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In: Current controversies in experimental philosophy. New York: : Routledge 2014. 109–27.<https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203122884>

31

Berker S. THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM. Philosophical Issues 2013;**23**:363–87. doi:10.1111/phils.12019

32

Singer DJ. How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. The Philosophical Quarterly 2018;**68**:580–602. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx056

33

Roberts P, Andow J, Schmidtke KA. Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. *Synthese* 2018;**195**:3267–87. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6

34

Shaffer J, Knobe J. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. *Noûs* Published Online First: 2012. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41682692&site=eds-live&scope=site>

35

DeRose K. Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* Published Online First: 2011. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41487722&site=eds-live&scope=site>

36

Buckwalter W. Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 2010;**1**:395–406. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3

37

Nagel, Jennifer. The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. *PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT* Published Online First: 2011. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edswah&AN=000208856300001&site=eds-live&scope=site>

38

Gerken M, Beebe J. Knowledge in and out of Contrast. *Nous* Published Online First: 2016. <https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com/doi/10.1111/nous.12064>

39

Nagel J. Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In: *Knowledge ascriptions*. Oxford: : Oxford University Press 2012. 171–91. <https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001>