

Knowledge, Science and Proof

PLEASE NOTE - This reading list is for the 2018/19 academic year and will be updated for the 2020/21 academic year. This is NOT the current year's reading list.

View Online



[1]

28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes:
<https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/>.

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Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes:
https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/.

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