

Knowledge, Science and Proof

PLEASE NOTE - This reading list is for the 2018/19 academic year and will be updated for the 2020/21 academic year. This is NOT the current year's reading list.

View Online



1.

Mills, C.W.: Alternative Epistemologies. In: Blackness Visible : Essays on Philosophy and Race. pp. 21–40. Cornell University Press (1998).

2.

Hartsock, N.C.M.: The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism. In: Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science. pp. 283–310. Reidel, Dordrecht (1983).

3.

McKinnon, R.: Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica (preprint deposited by the author on academia.edu). 92, 419–440 (2015).

4.

standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes,
https://www.listennotes.com/search/?q=standpoint%20epistemology&sort_by_date=0&scope=episode&offset=0&language=Any%20language&len_min=0&ecount_min=0.

5.

Fricker, M.: Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book). In: Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. pp. 147–175. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009).

6.

Nora Berenstain: Epistemic Exploitation. *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy*. 3, (2016).

7.

Jenkins, K.: Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*. 34, 191–205 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12174>.

8.

Kristie Dotson: A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*. 33, (2012). <https://doi.org/10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024>.

9.

Wesley Buckwalter: Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.

10.

28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes,
<https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/>.

11.

Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes,
https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/.

12.

Beeby, L.: A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Hardback). 111, 479–486 (2011). <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00319.x>.

13.

Stroud, B.: The significance of philosophical scepticism. Clarendon, Oxford (1984).

14.

Williams, M.: Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).

15.

Descartes, R., Weissman, D., Bluhm, W.T., Descartes, R.: Meditation One. In: Discourse on the method: and, Meditations on first philosophy. pp. 58–62. Yale University Press, New Haven.

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Ayer, A.J.: The problem of knowledge. Penguin, London (1956).

17.

Robinson, H.: Perception. Routledge, London (1994).

18.

Austin, J.L., Warnock, G.J.: Sense and sensibilia. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1962).

19.

Fischer, E., Engelhardt, P.E., Horvath, J., Ohtani, H.: Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. Synthese. (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4>.

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Blackmore, S.J.: Consciousness: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2017).

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Chalmers, D.J.: The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, New York (1996).

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Gettier, E.L.: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis. 23, (1963).
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3326922>.

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Williams, M.: Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).

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Fogelin, R.J.: Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. Oxford University Press, New York (1994).

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Williams, M.: Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2001).

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Fogelin, R.J.: Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories. In: Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. pp. 31–40. Oxford University Press, New York (1994).

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Keith DeRose: Introduction: Responding to Skepticism. In: Skepticism: a contemporary reader. Oxford University Press, New York (1999).

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Holyoak, K.J., Morrison, R.G., Holyoak, K.J.: A model of heuristic judgment. In: The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005).

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Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M: Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophy Compass*. 2, 56–80 (2007).

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Kenneth Boyd, Jennifer Nagel: The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In: *Current controversies in experimental philosophy*. pp. 109–127. Routledge, New York (2014).

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Berker, S.: THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM. *Philosophical Issues*. 23, 363–387 (2013). <https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12019>.

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Singer, D.J.: How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. *The Philosophical Quarterly*. 68, 580–602 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx056>.

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Roberts, P., Andow, J., Schmidtke, K.A.: Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. *Synthese*. 195, 3267–3287 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6>.

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Shaffer, J., Knobe, J.: Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. *Noûs*. (2012).

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DeRose, K.: Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*. (2011).

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Buckwalter, W.: Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*. 1, 395–406 (2010).
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0030-3>.

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Nagel, Jennifer: The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. *PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT*. (2011).

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Gerken, M., Beebe, J.: Knowledge in and out of Contrast. *Nous*. (2016).

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Nagel, J.: Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In: *Knowledge ascriptions*. pp. 171–191. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2012).