

Knowledge, Science and Proof

PLEASE NOTE - This reading list is for the 2018/19 academic year and will be updated for the 2020/21 academic year. This is NOT the current year's reading list.

View Online



1.

Mills, C. W. Alternative Epistemologies. in Blackness Visible : Essays on Philosophy and Race 21–40 (Cornell University Press, 1998).

2.

Hartsock, N. C. M. The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism. in Discovering reality: feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science vol. v. 161 283–310 (Reidel, 1983).

3.

McKinnon, R. Trans*formative Experiences. Res Philosophica (preprint deposited by the author on academia.edu) **92**, 419–440 (2015).

4.

standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes.
https://www.listennotes.com/search/?q=standpoint%20epistemology&sort_by_date=0&scope=episode&offset=0&language=Any%20language&len_min=0&ecount_min=0.

5.

Fricker, M. Hermeneutic Injustice (follow also for the whole book). in Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing 147–175 (Oxford University Press, 2009).

6.

Nora Berenstain. Epistemic Exploitation. *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy* **3**, (2016).

7.

Jenkins, K. Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* **34**, 191–205 (2017).

8.

Kristie Dotson. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* **33**, (2012).

9.

Wesley Buckwalter. Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*.

10.

28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes.
<https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/>.

11.

Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes.
https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/.

12.

Beeby, L. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Hardback) **111**, 479–486 (2011).

13.

Stroud, B. The significance of philosophical scepticism. (Clarendon, 1984).

14.

Williams, M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. (Oxford University Press, 2001).

15.

Descartes, R., Weissman, D., Bluhm, W. T. & Descartes, R. Meditation One. in Discourse on the method: and, Meditations on first philosophy 58–62 (Yale University Press).

16.

Ayer, A. J. The problem of knowledge. (Penguin, 1956).

17.

Robinson, H. Perception. (Routledge, 1994).

18.

Austin, J. L. & Warnock, G. J. Sense and sensibilia. (Clarendon Press, 1962).

19.

Fischer, E., Engelhardt, P. E., Horvath, J. & Ohtani, H. Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferences. Synthese (2019) doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02081-4.

20.

Blackmore, S. J. Consciousness: a very short introduction. vol. 121 (Oxford University Press, 2017).

21.

Chalmers, D. J. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. (Oxford University Press, 1996).

22.

Gettier, E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis **23**, (1963).

23.

Williams, M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. (Oxford University Press, 2001).

24.

Fogelin, R. J. Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification. (Oxford University Press, 1994).

25.

Williams, M. Problems of knowledge: a critical introduction to epistemology. (Oxford University Press, 2001).

26.

Fogelin, R. J. Chapter 2: Fourth-Clause Theories. in Pyrrhonian reflections on knowledge and justification 31–40 (Oxford University Press, 1994).

27.

Keith DeRose. Introduction: Responding to Skepticism. in Skepticism: a contemporary reader (Oxford University Press, 1999).

28.

Holyoak, K. J., Morrison, R. G. & Holyoak, K. J. A model of heuristic judgment. in The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

29.

Alexander, JoshuaWeiburg, Jonathan M. Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. *Philosophy Compass* **2**, 56–80 (2007).

30.

Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel. The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. in *Current controversies in experimental philosophy* 109–127 (Routledge, 2014).

31.

Berker, S. THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM. *Philosophical Issues* **23**, 363–387 (2013).

32.

Singer, D. J. How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. *The Philosophical Quarterly* **68**, 580–602 (2018).

33.

Roberts, P., Andow, J. & Schmidtke, K. A. Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. *Synthese* **195**, 3267–3287 (2018).

34.

Shaffer, J. & Knobe, J. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. *Noûs* (2012).

35.

DeRose, K. Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* (2011).

36.

Buckwalter, W. Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* **1**, 395–406 (2010).

37.

Nagel, Jennifer. The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox. *PHILOSOPHERS IMPRINT* (2011).

38.

Gerken, M. & Beebe, J. Knowledge in and out of Contrast. *Nous* (2016).

39.

Nagel, J. Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. in *Knowledge ascriptions* 171–191 (Oxford University Press, 2012).