

Knowledge, Science and Proof

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PLEASE NOTE - This reading list is for the 2018/19 academic year and will be updated for the 2020/21 academic year. This is NOT the current year's reading list.

28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes. (n.d.).
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