

Knowledge, Science and Proof

PLEASE NOTE - This reading list is for the 2018/19 academic year and will be updated for the 2020/21 academic year. This is NOT the current year's reading list.

View Online



1.

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standpoint epistemology in podcasts | Listen Notes.

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Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press; 2009:147-175.
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Nora Berenstain. Epistemic Exploitation. *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy*. 2016;3(22).
<https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo/12405314.0003.022/--epistemic-exploitation?rgn=main;view=fulltext>

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Kristie Dotson. A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies*. 2012;33(1). doi:10.5250/fronjwomestud.33.1.0024

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Wesley Buckwalter. Epistemic Injustice in Social Cognition. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. <https://philpapers.org/rec/BUCEII>

10.

28: Philosophy and #MeToo with Emily McWilliams - Examining Ethics (podcast) | Listen Notes.
<https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/examining-ethics/28-philosophy-and-metoo-with--ghaHy9C2Bw/>

11.

Prof Miranda Fricker - Epistemic Injustice - Radical Philosophy (podcast) | Listen Notes.
https://www.listennotes.com/podcasts/radical-philosophy/prof-miranda-fricker-8CQ7_TV-oDh/

12.

Beeby L. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Hardback). 2011;111(3pt3):479-486. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00319.x

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Stroud B. *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*. Clarendon; 1984.
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=3053315>

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Austin JL, Warnock GJ. *Sense and Sensibilia*. Clarendon Press; 1962.

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Chalmers DJ. *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. Oxford University Press; 1996. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uea/detail.action?docID=272854>

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Singer DJ. How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist. *The Philosophical Quarterly*. 2018;68(272):580-602. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx056

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Shaffer J, Knobe J. Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. *Noûs*. Published online 2012. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.41682692&site=eds-live&scope=site>

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Nagel J. Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In: *Knowledge Ascriptions*. 1st ed. Oxford University Press; 2012:171-191. <https://uea.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001>